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█ Abstract Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural 
activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness 
(OBJECTBOUND). I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical 
with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and 
the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, ra-
ther than the neural processes triggered by the banana. The bottom line is that one’s conscious experience 
of an object is the object one experiences. First, I outline the main hypothesis and the relation between 
mind, body, and object. Eventually, I address a series of traditional obstacles such as hallucinations, illu-
sions, and commonsensical assumptions. 
KEYWORDS: Identity Theory; Mind-body Problem; Consciousness; Hallucinations; Illusions. 
 
█ Riassunto Le esperienze sono oggetti. Verso una teoria dell’identità della mente in quanto oggetto - Le teo-
rie dell’identità tra mente e corpo di tipo tradizionale hanno affermato una relazione di identità tra co-
scienza e attività neurale. Si consideri una teoria dell’identità di carattere alternativo – propriamente una 
teoria dell’identità che intenda la coscienza come un oggetto (OBJECTBOUND). Suggerisco di conside-
rare la possibilità che la coscienza di qualcuno possa essere trattata come identica a un oggetto del mondo 
esterno. Sulla base di questa ipotesi, quando percepisco una banana gialla, ciò che coincide con la mia co-
scienza della banana gialla è proprio la banana gialla che si può prendere e mangiare, piuttosto che il pro-
cesso neurale innescato dalla banana. In definitiva l’esperienza cosciente di un oggetto che ciascuno ha è 
l’oggetto che si esperisce. In una prima parte, procederò con il delineare l’ipotesi principale e la relazione 
tra mente, corpo e oggetto. Successivamente cercherò di risolvere alcuni problemi di tipo tradizionale, 
quali le allucinazioni, le illusioni e gli assunti di senso comune. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Teoria dell’identità; Problema mente/corpo; Coscienza; Allucinazioni; Illusioni. 
 

TRADITIONAL MIND-BODY IDENTITY 
THEORIES maintain that consciousness1 is 
identical either to neural processes or to their 
properties.2 However, the identity between 
brain and consciousness has not proved so 
convincing, due to the obvious difference be-
tween neural activity and experience. As a 
result, alternative second-best notions have 
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been taken into consideration – e.g., emer-
gence, local supervenience, constituency, 
minimal sufficient basis, correlation, and the 
like. From a scientific perspective, such ef-
forts have been anomalous, though. In fact, 
in many – if not all – fields of scientific en-
quiry, scholars do not take into consideration 
such epistemic detours. They look for the re-
al thing – be it a boson or a virus. As regards 
consciousness, I revert back to the original 
and stronger notion of identity which I take 
to be the only solution compatible with phys-
icalism. In fact, I put forward a mind-object 
identity theory of consciousness. 
Being a die-hard physicalist, I assume 
that, if consciousness is real, it must be physi-
cal. By physical I mean material – energy and 
matter being two forms of the same stuff.3 In 
this regard, I share Armstrong’s view that «a 
man is a certain sort of material object».4 
Yet, I would surely disagree on his opinion 
that such an object is “his material body” – 
an object surely is, but not his body. Con-
sciousness must abide by the rules of the 
physical world – no ontological allowances 
are permitted. Like any other physical entity, 
from muons to raspberries, consciousness 
must be spatiotemporally located and causal-
ly relevant. In this spirit, the neural processes 
proposed by traditional identity theories are 
suitable candidates. Unfortunately, so far, the 
properties of neural processes do not match 
the properties of consciousness.5 
I suggest to take into consideration an-
other physical entity, namely the external ob-
ject. In short, the hypothesis is that, when I 
perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one 
and the same with my consciousness of the yel-
low banana is the very yellow banana one can 
grab and eat, rather than the neural processes 
triggered by the yellow banana – experience 
is physical but not necessarily neural. The 
bottom line is that one’s experience of an object 
is the object one experiences.  
Neural activity is not dismissed though. 
Its suggested role is causal rather than consti-
tutive. One’s body – sensorimotor apparatus 
and nervous system together – plays a con-
tingent causal role as, say, a dam plays a con-
tingent causal role in the existence of a lake. 
The dam, though, is not the lake. The dam is 
made of concrete and bricks while the lake is 
made of water. Of course, I adopt a naïve on-
tological stance as to the identity of the lake 
– the issue at stake is not to pinpoint the na-
ture of the lake (as opposed to, say, the wa-
ter), but to stress the difference between lake 
and dam, whatever they are. Lake and dam 
occupy a different spatial location. They are 
different in all respects. Yet, in practice, if the 
dam were destroyed, the lake would disap-
pear. Ceteris paribus, the dam brings the lake 
into existence. 
In this paper, first, I will emphasize the 
key explanatory function of identity theories. 
Second, I will outline the main hypothesis 
and the relation between mind, body, and ob-
ject. Third I will address, albeit in a sketchy 
way, a solution to a series of obstacles to such 
a view – ontological assumptions, hallucina-
tions, and illusions. Finally, I will tackle 
commonsensical notions that might hamper 
the understanding of the proposal. 
 
█  Identity theories and consciousness 
 
Many successful scientific theories are 
identity theories. In fact, such theories are 
key to understand nature. For instance, evo-
lution is an identity theory – it maintains 
that the process underlying species creation is 
a mixture of variation, transmission, and se-
lection. Thermodynamics is an identity theo-
ry too – temperature is average molecule 
speed. Newton’s gravitation theory is an 
identity theory – heavenly and earthly ob-
jects are inertial masses. And so forth.  
In the natural sciences, identity theories 
are popular because they provide an explana-
tion of the phenomenon A in terms of the 
phenomenon B. Usually, the explanation 
consists in providing good reasons as to why 
A is identical with B. Normally, adopting a 
naïve realist stance – like most scientists do – 
is sufficient to show that A’s properties and 
B’s properties are the same.  
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Thus, by Ockham’s razor and Leibniz’s 
principle of indiscernibles, A is B, and vi-
ceversa.6 In science, whenever possible, an 
identity theory is the right thing. 
As regards consciousness, identity theo-
ries have occasionally suffered from an unde-
served poor reputation. Traditional identity 
theories have suggested that consciousness is 
identical with neural processes or to the 
properties of such processes. Unfortunately, 
neural activity and consciousness do not fit 
well. Brains are gray and gooey, while experi-
ence is colorful, full of sounds and smells. It is 
filled with all manner of objects. Experience 
is akin to one’s world. Because of such a 
mismatch, many authors either rejected the 
identity between consciousness and physical 
processes7 or developed some stripe of repre-
sentationalism.8  
Both options, though, step outside of 
physicalism. On the one hand, dualism (of 
any stripe) resorts to additional non-physical 
entities or properties. On the other hand, 
representationalism, too, alludes to proper-
ties that do not belong to the physical world 
– e.g. having a content or being about some-
thing.9 In fact, so far, we do not have a natu-
ralistic theory of representations. 
More scientifically-oriented scholars have 
endorsed updated versions of traditional 
mind-brain identity theories,10 although they 
are not keen of calling them so. Most of such 
proposals are centered around the common 
premise that the physical processes produc-
ing11 experience are located inside the body, 
the nervous system, the brain.  
Ned Block reckons that such a view is the 
current orthodoxy – i.e., «the brain is the 
minimal constitutive supervenience base for 
experience»12 – a view labeled BRAIN-
BOUND. Jessy Prinz, too, admits that «a 
central plank of modern materialism [is] the 
supposition that consciousness supervenes 
on the brain».13 Such a view is held by many 
– if not all – neuroscientists too.14 Anil Seth 
states that «Any scientific study of con-
sciousness is based on the premise that phe-
nomenal experience is entailed by neuronal 
activity in the brain».15 Christof Koch ech-
oes that «If there is one thing that scientists 
are reasonably sure of, it is that brain activity 
is both necessary and sufficient for biological 
sentience»16 and «the entire brain is suffi-
cient for consciousness – it determines con-
scious sensations day in and day out […] like-
ly a subset of brainmatter will do».17  
Yet, BRAINBOUND, although extremely 
popular, has never been backed up by any 
conclusive evidence. Block himself admits 
that he has never heard anyone stating «that 
if a fusiform face area were kept alive in a 
bottle, the activation of it would determine 
face-experience – or any experience at all».18  
In other words, there is no definitive 
proof that a chunk of neurons carrying on 
certain chemical processes could, by itself, 
produce consciousness – not to mention be 
identical with consciousness. Neurons do not 
look like conscious experience at all. Does 
this mean that we have to give up the hope 
for a physicalist identity theory of conscious-
ness (as many philosophers and scientists 
did)?19 
I do not think so. In fact, neither is 
BRAINBOUND essential for physicalism nor 
is it for identity theories. Mind-body identity 
theories are based on two key claims (of 
which only one is BRAINBOUND): 
 
1. consciousness is identical with a physical 
phenomenon (PHYSICAL) 
 
2. such a phenomenon is inside the body or 
the brain (BRAINBOUND) 
 
The good news is that the two claims are 
utterly independent. It is easy to concoct pos-
sible scenarios in which one of them is true 
and the other is false. Crucially, only the de-
nial of PHYSICAL is incompatible with 
physicalism because it entails that there is 
something – namely consciousness – that is 
not physical. The two issues have been con-
fused to such an extent that the philosopher 
Jaegwon Kim feels plausible to state that «if 
you are a physicalist of any stripe, […] qualia 
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are supervenient on the internal physi-
cal/biological states of the subject».20 This is 
a not a valid inference. To me, it looks like a 
non sequitur. Pace Kim, only PHYSICAL is 
mandatory for physicalism. BRAINBOUND 
can be either true or false. No analytical, 
metaphysical, or nomological laws binds 
BRAINBOUND to PHYSICAL. Further-
more, BRAINBOUND has never been em-
pirically confirmed.  
Mind-Body identity theories have not 
failed because PHYSICAL proved to be false. 
Mind-body theories have failed because 
BRAINBOUND proved to be empirically 
false since no physical phenomenon has ever 
shown any of the properties of consciousness 
inside the body.21 As a result, traditional 
mind-body identity theories have failed since 
they required both claims to be true (PHYS-
ICAL and BRAINBOUND).  
Luckily, since BRAINBOUND is not es-
sential to physicalism, an unscathed identity 
theory is still available – namely, a mind-
object identity theory. I propose to consider 
another hypothesis – namely, that the expe-
rience is the external object itself (OBJECT-
BOUND). We can thus reject BRAIN-
BOUND and keep PHYSICAL. 
 
█  A mind-object identity theory 
 
Without any further ado, I outline a ten-
tative mind-object identity theory. The key 
hypothesis is that consciousness is identical 
with the object one experiences. Thus, physi-
calism is safe. PHYSICAL holds while 
BRAINBOUND does not. In this section, for 
the sake of explanation, I consider only cases 
of standard perception in which what one 
perceives is actually there – one perceives a 
yellow banana and there is a yellow banana. 
Suppose you perceive a yellow banana. 
Your body B and the yellow banana O on the 
table are all we need.  
 
O         B 
 
Thus far, no extra entity is needed to 
model what goes on. Your body is numerical-
ly different from the yellow banana. Two 
physical entities with different properties – 
the banana and your body – face each other. 
The problem arises when your experience E 
of the yellow banana is added to such a pic-
ture. What and where is E? What and where 
is the thing that your experience of the yellow 
banana is? Either we assume that E is some-
where inside your body, as brainbound 
scholars do, or we look elsewhere. Where? In 
the object itself. 
If we assumed that E is B – or some prop-
erty of B or inside B –, we would face an ex-
planatory failure. such an E would be utterly 
and hopelessly different from one’s actual 
experience; E would be utterly different from 
the object too. Yet, we can still play an un-
scathed alternative, namely the external ob-
ject itself. In the above example, the yellow 
banana. If neural activity is a suitable physi-
cal entity, the yellow banana, too, is suitable. 
Both entities are physical. Only parochial an-
thropocentric prejudices would attribute 
special properties to the former and deny 
them to the latter.  
Henceforth, the alternative hypothesis, 
OBJECTBOUND, is that E is O itself – your 
experience of the object is the external object. In 
this way, E is O, B is B and O is O. If E were 
identical with O, it would no longer be a mys-
tery that E had O’s properties. In fact, if the 
identity between object and experience held, 
one’s experience E and the object O would be 
one and the same. Given Ockham’s razor and 
Leibniz’s law of indiscernibles, the object and 
one’s experience would be one and the same. 
After all, your experience of the object is 
yellow and bananish. The banana in front of 
you is yellow and bananish too. Your experi-
ence has the same properties of the object 
you perceive. Isn’t it a promising start? In 
fact, many have observed that our experience 
is not different from the surrounding world22 
– it is made of objects, people, cars, buildings, 
trees, clouds, the sun, and stars. The physical 
properties of the body and those of the ob-
jects are known. They match! The brain is 
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pinkish-grey, gooey, and bloody. The banana 
is yellow, elongated, and bananish. Your ex-
perience is yellow, elongated and bananish. 
What is the thing that is yellow, elongated, 
and bananish? The brain or the yellow bana-
na? The answer is obvious – the banana! 
What more do we need to reckon such an 
obvious identity?  
Whenever you perceive – and thus expe-
rience – a yellow banana, something has ex-
actly the properties you experience – namely, 
the yellow banana. E is identical with O. The 
difference between neural activity and expe-
rience is no longer a reason to reject physical-
ism since consciousness is no longer inside 
the brain. The object triggers neural process-
es in one’s body, but both the object and 
one’s experience are numerically different 
from the body. E is O. B is neither O nor E. 
However, B allows O=E to exist like the dam 
allows the lake to exist – the relation between 
the body and the object will be outlined in 
detail in the next section. 
At this stage, a very likely objection is 
whether the object – the banana on the table 
– is really like my experience when I look at 
the banana. Do the banana and my experi-
ence have all and the same properties? I am 
well aware that, as of Galileo’s time, the 
standard reply is negative. However, I believe 
a positive answer can be defended. I split the 
reply in two halves. On the one side, I will 
address the properties of the object. On the 
other side, I will address the properties of the 
experience. 
As regards the object, one should distin-
guish the ideal object from the actual object 
one experiences. The ideal object is an ab-
straction that is tremendously useful in sci-
ence and accounting but something nobody 
ever gets acquainted with. Such an object is 
like the notion of center of mass, useful but 
immaterial. Conversely, the actual object is 
the object one grasps, sees, smells, and eats. It 
is something that always begins and ends in-
side an actual causal interaction. There is not 
enough space here to probe deeper into the 
connection between existence and causation, 
but it ought to be enough to note that the ob-
jects one sees are made of those properties 
that are causally coupled with one’s body. For 
instance, the banana on the table is undoubt-
edly emitting infrared. Yet, I am blissfully 
unaware of such an additional radiation and 
as regards the banana I see, infrareds are 
immaterial. In other words, the object I 
summon is the object made of those very 
physical properties my body picks out. We 
do not need anything else. Other physical 
properties (infrared, neutrinos, hidden fea-
tures) are simply not part of the (actual) ob-
ject I experience. 
Actual objects are all the objects we need. 
In fact, whenever we interact with an object, 
it is an actual object. It is the object that is 
singled out by the particular causal interac-
tion our body allows. Therefore, the tradi-
tional objection that the banana and the ex-
perience of a banana surely share many prop-
erties – such as being yellow and bananish –, 
but the banana has at least some properties 
that the experience of a banana lacks – such 
as being edible, being of a certain mass, com-
ing into existence at a certain time – is not 
effective since such an alleged banana is an 
ideal banana. It is neither the actual object 
nor our experience of it. It is not the actual 
banana we deal with. 
It is a fact that, for practical reasons, it is 
useful to lump together several actual objects 
in an ideal big bundle of properties. Yet, such 
a bundling is neither necessary nor always 
possible. For instance, consider Monna Lisa. 
Monna Lisa has, of course, a certain mass and 
thus a weight. Yet, no one – but Leonardo and 
some very restricted historians – has ever ex-
perienced Monna Lisa’s mass which is, as re-
gards the object everyone sees at Louvre, ut-
terly immaterial. Or, consider a cartoon char-
acter like Mickey Mouse – what is its weight? 
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On the other hand, even the most com-
plete account of an object is surely missing 
some outlandish physical property that only 
some esoteric causal circumstance might bring 
to life. However, nobody feels the need to go 
to such lengths to describe the object. Truth is 
that the alleged object is a standard list of 
physical properties as human environments 
usually allow. Such a list is never complete. 
The actual object, just sketched, is not a tem-
poral part of an object, it is a physical object in 
its own right. It is not a subset of the ideal ob-
ject. Rather, the notion of ideal object is akin 
to that of a center of mass or a meridian. 
A useful analogy is offered by the fridge 
light. Whenever we open the fridge door, the 
electricity flows and the light is switched on. 
As a result, whenever we check whether the 
light is on, the light is on. Of course, thanks to 
our understanding of the fridge structure, we 
know the light is not always on. Yet, we never 
see the light off. In the case of the actual ob-
jects that compose our everyday world, the 
equivalent of the open door is our own body.  
Whenever our body is in one location, the 
physical world takes place in a certain way and 
thus a given actual object is singled out. The 
actual object, though, is neither a mental en-
tity nor something inside our body.  
The actual object is a real physical object, 
located in the external world. It triggers a 
process that happens to end in our brain and 
requires our body to complete. When the 
fridge door is open, the current flows and the 
light is switched on. Likewise, when our body 
is in a certain place, a certain causal process 
flows, and its cause pops out into existence as 
a distinguishable whole – the cause being the 
actual object. Since the object exists whenev-
er our body is in the right place, the object – 
which is our experience – for us is always 
there, as the fridge light. 
The notion of actual object does not en-
dorse any form of idealism. On the contrary, 
it does not require any appeal to mentalistic 
notions. The claim is that one’s experience is 
identical to the object that is the external 
physical cause of one’s neural activity. This 
does not mean that the banana comes to exist 
(or ceases to exist) together with the experi-
ence of a banana, apart from the trivial fact 
that they are identical and thus they cannot 
exist separately. The banana is not brought 
into existence by the experience. The banana, 
as any other object, is brought into existence 
by a causal process.  
As it happens, the causal process takes 
place thanks to one’s body among other fac-
tors. Thus, the actual object, which is at once 
the external object and the thing usually 
called “experience”, takes place whenever my 
body is next to certain physical conditions. 
Coherently, the actual object does not exist 
unless the body is at the right place too – the 
lake does not exist without the dam, the light 
is not switched on unless the door is open. 
A visual banana is, of course, a different 
object than a tactile banana or a gustatory 
banana. Such objects are different causal ob-
jects. They are different causes singled out 
from the physical continuum by different 
processes. Molecules that are key causes for 
the somatosensory cortex are completely 
immaterial for the visual cortex. The neutri-
nos inside the banana are utterly immaterial 
for any human bodily structure, and so forth. 
We lump together the visual banana, the tac-
tile banana, and the gustatory banana for 
economical but parochial reasons – i.e., the 
banana can be eaten only once. 
As regards the properties of one’s experi-
ence, the widespread belief that the experience 
of the banana is different from the actual ob-
ject can be challenged too. Consider again the 
banana. What properties has my experience 
that the banana has not?  
It might be argued that the experience of a 
banana has at least some properties that the 
banana lacks – such as being private (and not 
sharable), coming into existence at a certain 
time t1, ceasing to exist at a certain time t2 etc. 
Yet, the notion of actual object overcomes 
such issues.  
First, the actual object is both private and 
physical. It is private in the same sense in 
which every rainbow is private because it is 
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defined by the location from which it is 
seen.23 It is physical too, since it is not inside 
the mind, but it is there, in the cloud, made 
of only those raindrops that the sun’s and the 
beholder’s position single out. 
Second, the actual object is the cause of 
one’s neural activity. Thus the actual object – 
as the fridge light analogy should make clear 
– is part of what my experience is at the right 
moment in time. The same actual object, 
though, might exist because of other causal 
circumstances of identical effect. The human 
body is not special in any respect. The hu-
man body is just a structure that embodies 
the causal conditions that allows the world as 
we know it to take place. Of course, from our 
parochial perspective, our human bodies are 
paramount. Human bodies are the condi-
tions that allows the objects, our experience 
is identical with, to exist. Thus, in practice, 
we cannot exist without our bodies. 
Third, one might continue to rebuke that 
the experience of the banana has perspec-
tivalness, phenomenal character, intentional-
ity, qualitative properties, and so forth. Yet, 
and forgive me if I am preposterously brief 
on such a key topic, all these properties have 
not been experienced, they have been con-
ceived to back up the alleged gap between 
consciousness and the physical world. Once 
such a gap is set aside, don’t they disappear?  
For instance, Nagel’s notion of phenome-
nal character is mostly a reaction to the 
mind-body problem in terms of identity be-
tween mental states and brain states. His 
claim that «an organism has conscious men-
tal states if and only if there is something that 
it is like to be that organism […] We may call 
this the subjective character of experience»24 
is an offshoot of the idea that experience 
must be inside the body, or a property of 
what takes place inside the body. Once this 
assumption is set aside, the mind-object 
identity reboots the whole discussion.  
The identity between experience and ex-
ternal objects, if workable, does not need an 
ineffable subjective character. Subjective phe-
nomenal character was required to overcome 
the limitation of the traditional mind-brain 
identity hypothesis. In contrast, if experience 
and objects are one and the same – exactly the 
same –, no subjective character is required. 
In fact, the mind-object identity puts for-
ward a solution to the issue of aboutness (aka 
intentionality). Aboutness becomes unneces-
sary. Experience is no longer about or of the 
banana – experience is the banana. Experience 
does no longer access the external world, ex-
perience is the external world. In fact, the ap-
peal to aboutness has always been a case of ob-
scurum per obscurius. Brentano had the lati-
tude to appeal to intentionality since he was a 
sort of dualist. In the physical world, 
aboutness among objects has never been spot-
ted. Semantics has never been part of the list 
of physical properties. Objects are just what 
they are. Bananas are bananas. Human bodies 
are human bodies. Neurons are neurons. 
A caveat. OBJECTBOUND is not a stripe 
of panpsychism. I do not claim that the ex-
ternal object has phenomenal properties 
smeared over it. After all, panpsychism is a 
form of prodigal dualism. I stress that we 
have no reasons to posit any additional phe-
nomenal properties in addition to the prop-
erties the physical world has. Physical prop-
erties are both the familiar properties of the 
world we experience and the properties of 
our experience that is our experience – the 
two being the same. There is no need for an 
additional and unfathomable phenomenal 
layer – no matter to what extent phenomenal 
qualities are distributed prodigally. 
To recap, I do not balk at the question as 
to whether the properties of the object and 
the properties of the experience are the same. 
Once the object under scrutiny is the actual 
object – the two sets of properties are exactly 
the same. Or so I will argue. There is nothing 
in one’s experience of an object that does not 
partake the object and, viceversa, there is no 
need to conceive the object as anything but 
what one experiences.  
Philosophical intuitions might have been 
different if people had compared experience 
with external objects rather than with neural 
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activity. If, due to various preconceptions, 
one looks for experience in the wrong place, 
one will likely yet erroneously conclude that 
nothing physical is like one’s experience. In 
fact, neural activity is not. Yet, the external 
object might be. BRAINBOUND does not 
hold. OBJECTBOUND might do. 
 
█  Mind, body and world 
 
Three traditional notions – “mind” (aka 
experience), “body” and “object” – can thus be 
revisited. The body is an observable part of 
the physical world. It has causal properties. It 
is spatiotemporally located. It is a physical en-
tity. Its properties are quantifiable and meas-
urable. The external object is amenable to ob-
servation and measurement. It is physical. It 
has causal properties. Its properties are quan-
tifiable and measurable. Up to here, neither of 
them is ontologically problematic. Everything 
is physical observable and causally effica-
cious. Then the mind (aka experience) jumps 
onto the stage. Where and what is the mind 
then? The proposal is that the mind is physi-
cal but not inside the body. At any given 
time, the mind is the object, or the collection 
of objects one experiences.  
What is the role of the body? The body al-
lows the external object to exist and to inter-
act with other objects. The body is a sort of 
causal enabler. It enables the world we expe-
rience to have the very causal properties we 
experience. The body brings into existence 
the objects our world is made of. The world 
we live in and our experience of the world 
are, in such a model, one and the same.  
A good metaphor is offered by the afore-
mentioned dam and lake. A dam is among 
the necessary conditions for the lake for-
mation. However, the lake is not the dam. 
The lake is made of water while the dam is 
made of concrete, brick, and steel girders. 
Furthermore, if a draught occurred, the dam 
would not create a lake. The lake takes place 
– and thus it exists – thanks to many condi-
tions (a suitable terrain, a certain amount of 
rain, the dam). From a builder’s perspective, 
the dam is key for the existence of the lake. 
Yet, the lake is neither identical with nor con-
stituted by the dam. The dam plays a contin-
gent causal role. A dam-lake identity theory 
would fail. Likewise, the body plays a contin-
gent causal role insofar the object one experi-
ences takes place. The body singles out a cer-
tain object among the many possible ones.  
Back to the object, you see a banana from 
a certain angle and with certain properties – 
color, smell, texture – among the infinite 
possible ones. Such a banana, which is out-
side your body, is a subset of the physical 
world, it acquires causal relevance thanks to 
the interaction with your body that has cer-
tain sensori-motor and cognitive skills. The 
body allows such a banana to exist. The ba-
nana you perceive, though, is not God’s ba-
nana, so to speak – it lacks many physical 
features that an ideal object would have. It is 
not the ideal banana. For instance, you do 
not perceive the inside of the object, nor the 
hidden side, nor many chemicals, nor infra-
reds. And so forth. It is the actual banana. 
The banana is a subset of the physical 
continuum in front of your body. The object 
you perceive is the one your body selected 
among many available ones. The banana re-
mains outside the body and it is not a proper-
ty of the body, as the lake remains outside of 
the dam. Experiences are not inside bodies, 
but bodies are necessary for the physical 
things one’s experience is made of to exist. 
We are such things. 
In this case, language is misleading. The 
traditional sentence “we have an experience of 
an object” is confusing since it suggests that 
there is a multitude of entities – i.e., we, the 
experiencing of something, and the external 
object. The hypothesis I put forward is much 
simpler: there is only one thing – i.e., the ob-
ject – which is our own experience. We are 
our experiences, too. We are physical then. 
Not only the external object has the same 
properties of experience, but it is also there 
when we experience something. Thus – leav-
ing momentarily aside memory, dreams, 
misperception, illusions and hallucinations –, 
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the external object is an obvious physical 
candidate for consciousness.  
The body, or some part of it, is clearly 
necessary, but it is neither sufficient to nor 
identical with conscious experience. The 
body has a contingent necessary causal de-
pendence that is coherent with the wealth of 
data from neuroscience. In fact, all evidence 
gathered by neuroscientists has never provid-
ed a single case in which neural experience is 
absolutely sufficient25 for consciousness. Neu-
roscience has proved only that neural activity 
is contingently necessary for consciousness. By 
contingently necessary I mean something 
weaker than being necessary. For instance, so 
far, no scientists have been able to rule out 
machine consciousness. No scientist has ever 
been able to suggest any kind of necessary link 
between the carbon-based molecules featured 
by living organisms and consciousness.26 Ac-
tually, many believes machine consciousness is 
a real possibility.27 If machine consciousness 
was possible, neural activity would not even be 
necessary. The bottom line is that, at best, 
neuroscientists have provided evidence only 
for very weak forms of necessity. 
To recap, without the body, conscious ex-
perience cannot occur because the object 
does not take place. Yet, consciousness is not 
a property of the body. Neither is it some-
thing additional to the object.  
One’s experience is the object and the ob-
ject is one’s experience. The body allows a 
collection of objects to act together. In other 
words, the body allows a subset of the world 
– i.e. a collection of objects – to take place as 
a composite spatiotemporally super-object, 
which is an object nonetheless. At any given 
time, such a super-object is what we call one’s 
mind (or one’s consciousness) – which is 
nothing but a collection of objects. 
 Can the solution to the mind-body prob-
lem be so simple? Can changing the physical 
candidate for experience from the body to 
the external object be enough? I suspect it is. 
I am also aware that such a hypothesis will 
face formidable skepticism. 
At first sight, one might be puzzled – ex-
perience and objects? Aren’t they supposed 
to be different? Doesn’t a whole legion of 
classical philosophical arguments place a 
chasm between experience and physical ob-
jects? Isn’t there a general consensus that 
consciousness and objects are different and 
even incommensurable? Yes, but most of 
traditional fences between mind and world 
have been an offshoot of BRAINBOUND. In 
other words, many scholars have held that 
experience and world are different because 
they assumed BRAINBOUND to be true.28 
Commonly, the widespread consensus 
that experience does not fit with reality has 
thrived on two alleged gaps.29 On the one 
hand, it has meant that our experience does 
not fit with reality. I perceive a yellow banana 
and there is a yellow banana, yet the physical 
banana is not really yellow like the mental 
banana I experience. For instance, neurosci-
entists are keen to point out that colors are in 
the head and objects are not really colored.30 
On the other hand, it has meant that what we 
experience does not fit with reality.  
I see a yellow banana and there is no yel-
low banana – e.g., I hallucinate a yellow ba-
nana.31 Historically, such gaps have been fur-
ther articulated in four recurrent issues.  
 
1) Experience is different from physical pro-
cesses (hard problem) 
 
2) Experience is different from what experi-
ence is about (aboutness, and the vehi-
cle/content distinction) 
 
3) What experience is about is different 
from what there is (hallucination) 
 
4) What the is about is different from what 
the experience is supposed to be about (il-
lusions) 
 
Let’s address such issues one by one. 
 
█  Hard problem 
 
The notion that a gap keeps mental and 
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physical properties apart is a sort of dogma at 
least since Galileo32 and it has recently been 
rebranded as the Hard Problem.33 The main 
point has not changed much though, namely 
the mental properties we experience are dif-
ferent from the physical properties of the 
world. And yet, has such a dogma ever been 
observed rather than stated? 
In fact, how could anyone check whether 
phenomenal properties are different from 
physical ones if physical properties are taken 
to be, by definition, impossible to experi-
ence? How do we know that physical proper-
ties are not like the properties we experience 
day and night? We can assume it, of course. 
But it is a self-defeating assumption. In fact, 
if physical properties were really hidden by 
phenomenal properties, nobody could check 
what they are like. Conversely, if we experi-
enced physical properties directly, we could 
not check whether they are akin to phenom-
enal properties. However, if this were the 
case, the premise would be false.  
The Hard Problem’s might not be as un-
disputable as it has often appeared to be. We 
could not compare experience to the world, if 
experience and world were different. On the 
one side, if experience was ontologically dif-
ferent from the world, how could we com-
pare experience with physical entities to veri-
fy to what extent they match? On the other 
side, if experience were not physical, we would 
not be able to confront it with the physical 
world, because, as mentioned above, it would 
be completely incommensurable. Yet, we 
compare experience and world routinely.  
 When we look at our experience, we see 
the world – we see chairs, colors, people. In 
contrast, if we look inside our bodies, nothing 
matches our experience – we see neurons, 
bones, and blood vessels. It is a fact that the 
properties of our experience are different 
from the properties of our brains. The differ-
ence between brain and experience does not 
mean that no physical entity has the proper-
ties of our experience. It means only that our 
brains are not the right entity. External objects 
might be the things our brains are not. 
The hard problem stems from considera-
tions of the sort – “I see green peas but noth-
ing in my cortex is like green peas” or “I smell 
a rose but nothing in my entorhinal cortex 
smells like a rose”. They are correct claims, of 
course. Yet, they do not rule out the possibil-
ity that something else might be like green 
peas or roses. What about green peas, and 
bananas?  
In fact, since we experience roses, peas, 
and bananas, there must be something in the 
physical world that is identical with our expe-
riences. Roses, peas, and bananas are a nice 
option that is fully compatible with physical-
ism. To recap, the hard problem is an off-
shoot of the demise of mind-body identity 
theories. 
 
█  Aboutness 
 
Another traditional conceptual crutch 
that has kept experience and world apart 
without having to pay a too high ontological 
prices is the representational stance – namely 
the notion that representations have the lux-
ury of being physically different from what 
they represent. Such a notion is correct in the 
case of conventional representations that 
benefit from the agreement of a community 
of users arbitrarily stipulating whatever asso-
ciation they like between symbols and their 
meanings.34  
Yet, it does not work in the case of mental 
representations insofar as they lack 
aboutness or intentionality. Such a power 
would be very handy, if only were real. Un-
fortunately, apart from the mind, there is no 
evidence that anything else had any inten-
tionality. Pebbles and stars are just pebbles 
and stars. Physical entities are not about 
something; they are what they are.  
Likewise, it would be unreasonable to re-
quest or to hope or to demand that neural pro-
cesses are anything but neural processes. Why 
should they let emerge exotic properties – e.g., 
aboutness – that physical laws neither allow or 
foresee? The elusive notion of intrinsic inten-
tionality has never popped out from any physi-
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cal system. Postulating the mental and hoping 
to find such a property in the physical world – 
as many scholars have done since Brentano35 
tumbles down into dualism.  
As regards conscious experience, we can 
step back and avoid the whole aboutness cir-
cus. Aboutness, semantics, and intentionality 
can be left to more epistemological levels of 
explanation. The issue at stake here is whether 
our experience of the yellow banana is a bio-
logical activity that, by virtue of being about 
the banana, gives us the experience of a yellow 
banana or whether our experience is yellow 
and bananish.  
The latter option, the one I defend here, 
has never been taken too much seriously into 
consideration because of an obvious setback – 
the purported physical phenomenon, which is 
neural activity, has never had any serious pos-
sibility of being yellow and bananish. A differ-
ent option – the external object – extinguishes 
the need for aboutness. 
It’s not obvious what should the tradi-
tional distinction between vehicle and con-
tent amount to, in the physical world. Of 
course, conceptually, the distinction is crystal 
clear. Yet, physically, what does it amount to? 
I understand the difference between the 
length and the mass of an object. But who has 
ever observed the content of a physical entity 
as opposed to that physical entity as such? 
Nobody, of course.  
If we observe a memory cell, we do not 
see its content, we see the electronic circuit. 
We can see the content only if that electronic 
circuit pilots a graphic card or a printer. In 
fact, such devices are designed to build phys-
ical replica of objects either by means of col-
ors on a screen or ink pigments on a sheet of 
paper. Colored screens and stained sheets are 
further physical objects – they are not con-
tent. In the brain there are neither screens 
nor pigments. Thus, from a physical perspec-
tive, the distinction between vehicle and con-
tent is once more a costly addition to the 
physical world. 
To recap, the presented hypothesis sug-
gests that experience, too, is like everything 
else in nature – i.e., something that is only 
what it is. However, since experiences are ob-
jects, both the vehicle/content distinction 
and aboutness are no longer needed. The no-
tion of intentionality and the vehicle/content 
distinction arose because it was held that E is 
physically realized by B. Since everybody saw 
that B was not O, B had to somewhat reach 
out for O. OBJECTBOUND sets the matter 
differently. If E is O, the intentionality arrow 
is no longer needed. E is already where it 
should be. E is O. If E is O, E need not to 
reach O. E is already there. Identity is much 
stronger than intentionality. Moreover, iden-
tity is compatible with a physical world. 
 
█  Hallucination and dreams 
 
At this point, I suspect, many readers are 
eager to advance a crucial objection, namely 
misperception. The obvious empirical reason 
why many scholars have gone to such lengths 
to keep experience and world apart has been 
that, allegedly, experience can take place 
without any object – e.g., in cases of halluci-
nation or dreams, Macbeth sees a dagger and 
there is no dagger. Alternatively, one experi-
ences the object differently from what the 
object is – e.g., in cases of illusions, Emily 
sees a reddish patch but the patch is gray. 
Does OBJECTBOUND survive such cases? 
First, I will address hallucinations. 
Hallucinations have been so influential on 
mind scholars that they have become the 
standard reference for any model of experi-
ence – everyday perception included. Fair 
point. Both in science and in philosophy, it 
has become customary to explain perception 
in terms of hallucinations rather than the re-
verse, which is puzzling.  
In my opinion, it would seem a lot more 
reasonable to start from perception and then 
to proceed towards abnormal cases. After all, 
from an evolutionary perspective, perception 
is surely more fundamental than hallucina-
tions. Moreover, the hallucinatory oriented 
explanation of experience does not provide 
per se any solution as to why experience 
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should take place and be what it is.  
Postulating that experience is a form of 
environment-driven hallucination does not 
provide any clarification about the nature, the 
cause, and the role of experience. If anything, 
it adds mystery to an already obscure matter. 
The dreaming brain is often presented as 
the paradigmatic case of an isolated physical 
system allegedly capable of producing con-
sciousness. According to Atti Revonsuo the 
 
 dreaming brain shows us that sensory in-
put and motor output are not necessary 
[…]. The dreaming brain creates the phe-
nomenal level and […] provides us with in-
sights into the processes that are sufficient 
for producing the phenomenal level.36  
 
Revonsuo is unambiguous. If the dreaming 
brain were sufficient to create a fully blown 
phenomenal world regardless of the world, sen-
sory-motor input-output would no longer be 
necessary. Yet, is the dreaming brain truly dis-
connected from the environment?  
Many neuroscientists and philosophers 
believe so. Giulio Tononi and Christof Koch 
take that it is a platitude that  
 
when we dream, we are virtually discon-
nected from the environment. We 
acknowledge almost nothing of what hap-
pens around us, and our muscles are largely 
paralyzed. Nevertheless, we are conscious, 
sometimes vividly and grippingly so.37  
 
Yet, neuroscientists often underestimate 
two key facts: (1) the brain is always the out-
come of previous interactions with the world 
– no matter how far in the past; (2) there is 
no evidence one could dream anything whose 
constituents are not part of one’s world. 
 When we hallucinate a yellow banana 
and no yellow bananas are available in the 
proximal surroundings, we conclude that we 
experience something that does not exist. It’s 
easy to see the logical steps that lead from 
such an alleged empirical fact – experiencing 
something that does not exist – to the experi-
ence/world apartheid. In fact, if one experi-
enced a banana that does not exist, it would 
be tempting to hold that experience is indeed 
independent from the world.  
Moreover, since neural processes do not 
resemble bananas, the widespread but trou-
blesome view that there are three items – a 
vehicle (the neural process), content (the ba-
nana one experiences), and the object (the 
banana one grabs and eats) – seems very 
convincing. Still, such a view is based on the 
assumption that we know what our experi-
ence is and, crucially, what our experience is 
about. Only if we assumed we know both 
terms, we could conclude that they are dif-
ferent. In fact, the whole chain of inferences 
is based on two premises, namely (1) S expe-
riences O, and (2) O does not exist.38 
While there has been a lot of debate about 
the first premise – e.g. disjunctivism is based on 
its refutation39 –, almost none challenged the 
second premise. I take the first premise to be 
true, but I challenge the second one. While I do 
not pretend to provide a complete refutation of 
it, I believe it is possible to highlight some cues 
as to why the alleged absence of the physical 
object might have been overestimated.40 To be 
clear, I will argue that whenever one halluci-
nates a banana, the banana exists. O does exist. 
The rebuttal of the second premise – O does 
not exist – comes in two steps.  
First, I note that, to the best of our 
knowledge, everything we dream or halluci-
nate is made of elements we have met before. 
Dreams and hallucinations can provide new 
combinations, but they do not concoct new 
elements. Dreams are made of objects and 
properties their dreamers have met during 
their lives. For instance, congenitally blind 
subjects neither dream nor hallucinate col-
ors.41 Charles Bonnett patients hallucinate 
replicas of their previous lives, albeit reshuf-
fled.42 Penfield’s subjects hallucinate previous 
life episodes.43 And so forth.  
In short, it appears that dreams and hallu-
cinations are literally made of pieces of the 
physical world one lives and has lived in. Hal-
lucinations and dreams do not create new 
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mental components, rather they recombine 
the properties and the things their world has 
been made of. Hallucinations are chimeric. 
The traditional philosophical notion of 
hallucination fleshes out a phenomenon that 
has no necessary connection with the actual 
physical world one lives in – after all, that’s 
the point of having a hallucination, isn’t it? 
No, it is not. Actual hallucinations are differ-
ent. If the actual evidence and hallucinators’ 
reports are scrutinized, a completely differ-
ent picture emerges. Hallucinations are not 
arbitrary concoctions. They are constrained 
by the world subjects live in. Hallucinations 
are more similar to a chimeric reshuffling of 
the physical world one lives in, than the out-
come of an unconstrained mental generator. 
Yet, a doubt is on its way – often such 
previous objects, events, and their properties 
are no more. They were part of one’s life but 
they no longer exist at the time of one’s 
dream or hallucination. For instance, you 
dream of a banana today, but you ate the ba-
nana yesterday. Thus the banana cannot ex-
ist at the time of your dream. To solve this 
obstacle, the second step, perhaps the most 
critical one, kicks in. In short, the idea is that, 
due to nomological speed limits, everything 
we perceive is – to some extent – in the past. 
Thus the present is not what takes place at a 
given time, but rather it is the set of events 
that causes neural activity at any given time.  
In the case of standard perception, we as-
sume that the object we perceive is there at 
the time and the place where we are. This 
picture is, clearly, a gross approximation. As a 
matter of fact, the object we perceive is never 
in the same place where we are. It might be a 
few inches or thousands of miles farther away. 
I can look at a banana on my desk or I can 
look at the sun. There are no ontological gaps 
between such cases – they are points on a 
continuum. Thus, from a spatial perspective, 
the notion that the object is “there” can be 
stretched at will. “There” can mean some-
thing as far away as billions of miles.  
Once the notion of “there” has been 
stretched spatially, one might venture to 
stretch it temporally too. In fact, due to the 
mentioned nomological speed limits, every 
phenomenon extended in space is also ex-
tended in time.44 Thus, although most every-
day phenomena are so close that the time de-
lay is negligible, they are not synchronous ei-
ther. In many cases, the time delay can be 
huge. For instance, a familiar object like the 
moon is one second away from the corre-
sponding neural activity; the sun is eight 
minutes away; stars can be years away. In 
short, a temporal continuum can be envi-
sioned, too. Thus, we can consider a spread 
now. In fact, a proximal notion of the now 
does not make any sense. 
In short, my rebuttal of the second prem-
ise is straightforward – whenever S experi-
ences O, O is there, provided that the notion 
of “there” and “now” have been revised and 
stretched. Whenever we experience some-
thing – be it a standard perception, a dream, 
or a hallucination – to the extent that what 
we perceive has occurred at some place and 
time, the object is still the cause of one’s neu-
ral activity. Thus the object may well be the 
thing that is identical with one’s experience, 
no matter when or where it occurred. 
On the other hand, the standard view – 
albeit apparently more reassuring – is not 
without problems. In fact, the notion that 
one perceives only nearby objects is parochial 
and vague. How near should an object be to 
be near enough? Neither in time nor in space, 
valid thresholds are available. All objects and 
events occur at an earlier time than one’s 
neural activity.  
By nomological necessity, the external cause 
of everything that takes place in our brain is in 
the past. Such past can be relatively near or very 
remote as is the case for astronomical objects. 
Either way, though, perception is never instan-
taneous. And thus any object is always at the 
beginning of a process spread over a time span 
and across a spatial extension. If stars and long 
gone events – as those that are the causes of 
one’s memory, dreams, and hallucination – 
were rejected, by the same token, all everyday 
objects ought to be rejected too.  
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In essence, the traditional view comes to 
limit one’s world to the very proximal shell 
that surrounds one’s skin and receptors, which 
is absurd. We do not perceive the world by 
means of a thin layer of events enveloping our 
bodies. We perceive external objects wherever 
and whenever they are. Crucially, between 
perception and other forms of experience – 
such as memory, dreams and hallucination – 
there is only a quantitative difference. 
To recap. Traditionally, the argument 
from hallucination is based on two premises, 
namely (1) S experiences O, and (2) O does 
not exist. Here I argue that the former is true 
while the latter is false. Whenever S experi-
ences O, O does exist! However, O does exist 
where and when it likes, so to speak. For in-
stance, John suffers from Charles Bonnet 
syndrome and thus he hallucinates multiple 
copies of men of abnormal size in his fields of 
view. The traditional explanation is that his 
brain concocts such images. The alternative 
explanation is that past human beings are 
still the object of John’s experience and thus 
are still experienced. 
 
█  Illusions 
 
Sometimes the object is there, yet it does 
not appear as we expect it should. You look at 
the two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion and 
they appear of different lengths but we know 
they are of equal length. While illusions are not 
as dramatic as hallucinations, they seem to pro-
vide another formidable empirical case for a 
separation between what one experiences and 
the properties of external objects.  
Yet, once more, the above traditional ac-
count is based on the assumption that we 
know what we perceive. Consider again the 
Müller-Lyer illusion. You assume there is a 
property – length – and that such a property is 
the very property you perceive. In everyday 
life, the property one perceives and length 
match against each other quite well. Yet, in 
the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion, they do 
not. Since they mismatch, you assume experi-
ence is to be blamed. Such an epistemic habit 
is so common that many scholars promptly 
draw the conclusion that one perceives a 
wrong length. A popular model of illusion is 
that one perceives a mental length that does 
not match against the physical length.45 
Such an explanation is surely popular. Yet, 
it is based on two critical assumptions: 
 
1) one experiences a mental property that 
should mysteriously match against the 
physical property;  
2) one knows exactly what is the physical 
property one perceives.  
 
I argue that both assumptions are flawed 
and that once we set them, a much simpler 
explanation becomes available. The former 
assumption is question-begging since the ex-
istence of mental properties is what should 
be proved rather than assumed. The latter 
assumption is flawed since, as I will argue 
right below, we do not know exactly what we 
perceive. The reasons why one perceives a 
property and one believes to perceive another 
one are economic rather than conceptual. It is 
often difficult to directly measure a physical 
property and it is much easier to perceive 
some other more easily accessible property. 
Consider again the Müller-Lyer illusion. 
Due to the structure of their sensory appa-
ratus, human beings lack a mean to directly 
perceive the lengths of object. Human eyes are 
not equipped with lasers. Human beings must 
cope with a rather deficient visual system.46  
However, thanks to natural selection, 
they have acquired the estimate indirectly 
length by means of perceiving other, more 
easily accessible geometrical projections that, 
give or take, reliably correlate with length. 
The skill is very useful and thus humans use 
such an approximate property to estimate 
length. Crucially, such a skill does not pick 
up length, but another property which is a 
complex cluster of geometrical properties. 
Call such approximate but optically available 
property, the proxy property. Call the absolute 
physical length, the alleged property. In ex-
traordinary cases, though, such as the Müller-
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Lyer illusion, the proxy length is different 
from the alleged length.  
As a result, one perceives the two lines as 
having different lengths. Yet, the two lines do 
not have different alleged lengths, they have 
different proxy lengths. Yet, both proxy and al-
leged lengths are external physical properties. 
There is no need to resort to any mental length. 
Neither is there any misperception or misexpe-
rience, only misbeliefs. The experience is cor-
rect. It is the belief about what one perceives 
that it is mistaken. We believed we knew what 
we perceive when we perceive length.  
We were mistaken. One of the Müller-
Lyer lines has a greater proxy length than the 
other one. Thus one perceives a different 
proxy length. No perceptual error occurs, the 
mistake is a matter of misbelief. One believes 
to perceive the absolute length of objects, 
while one perceives something else that usual-
ly matches with the absolute length. This time, 
though, it does not. This shift in perspectives 
allows us to reconceive all cases of illusion as 
cases of misbeliefs about what one perceives.  
For instance, consider the traditional illu-
sion of mirages, one sees water where there is 
no water, as in the desert. Yet, by means of 
vision we have no way to know whether a 
substance is made of water. Thus what do we 
do? We perceive another proxy property – in 
this case, mirror-like light reflectance. Such a 
property, in a natural environment, is often 
instantiated by pools of water. Thus, we get 
used to believing that mirror-like light reflec-
tance is being watery. Being made of water is 
the property we are interested in, because we 
need water to survive, but mirror-like reflec-
tance is good enough. However, sometimes, 
unusual circumstances occur and thus we are 
puzzled. Being made of water is the alleged 
property, mirror-like reflectance is the proxy 
property. 
As a last example, consider weight and 
mass. Human beings estimate mass by means 
of weight. On the earth, people grab some-
thing and perceive the strength that such an 
object exerts on their arm. However, an as-
tronaut on the moon feels a much weaker 
force. The lunar gravity pull is much weaker 
than the earth’s and thus the weight of each 
object is greatly diminished on the surface of 
our satellite (roughly one sixth of the weight 
on the earth). However, the mass of objects 
is, of course, always the same. Thus, an as-
tronaut feels as though objects weighted less. 
If one applied the same logic used in cases of 
illusions, one ought to conclude that the as-
tronaut has the illusion that objects have less 
mass on the moon than on the earth.  
In fact, nobody has ever explained what 
happens to astronauts in terms of illusory 
perception – it would be pointless to claim 
that the astronaut has the illusion that object 
masses are diminished. In fact, human beings 
are interested to the mass of objects.  
For instance, one may weigh a bag to 
know how many bananas are inside, a child 
to feel the passage of time, a flask to know 
how much water is still inside, or a medallion 
to know how much gold is in it. Since we 
know the property which is perceived to es-
timate mass – i.e., weight –, it is obvious that, 
on the moon, such a property is smaller than 
on the earth. However, weight is neither an 
illusory mass nor a mental mass. Weight is 
just the physical property that earthlings use 
to conveniently to estimate mass. Using the 
suggested terminology, weight is the proxy 
property, while mass is the alleged property. 
The conceptual shift allows us to avoid 
any mental or illusory additional properties – 
it allows us to deal only with physical proper-
ties. Everything we perceive is a physical 
property in the external world. Illusions are 
not misperception but erroneous beliefs 
about the nature of the physical properties 
one perceives. Illusions are not a case against 
OBJECTBOUND.47 
 
█  It cannot be so – commonsense and 
skepticism 
 
I suspect that the main negative reactions 
against then proposed hypothesis are not of 
conceptual nature, but rather a matter of hab-
it. In other words, the possibility that the thing 
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we are – insofar as we are our experience – is 
the external object is just perceived as too bi-
zarre to be true. Yet, the point is not whether a 
hypothesis seems unlikely, but whether such a 
hypothesis conflicts with available evidence 
and whether it is logically acceptable.  
In the past, umpteenth notions were taken 
to be completely convincing – e.g., the stilness 
of the earth, the fixity of the continents, the 
immutability of species, the existence of abso-
lute space, the role of luminiferous ether, and 
so forth. Notwithstanding the fact that such 
notions used to lead to all kind of issues, they 
were rarely questioned. I suspect that the no-
tion that BRAINBOUND belong to the same 
group of notions – they are beliefs we hold 
true in the utter lack of evidence. What’s 
worse, assuming that BRAINBOUND is true 
has encouraged many scholars to introduce 
all kinds of mysterious conceptual crutches – 
e.g., aboutness, vehicle/content distinction, 
intentionality, qualia, phenomenal character, 
and the like. 
Consider the analogy with the notion of 
absolute vs relative velocity. Until a certain 
stage of scientific development, velocity was 
taken to be an absolute property. Either you 
were moving or you were not. In such a con-
ception, if one had claimed that the Rocke-
feller Center moves, one would have been 
taken to be nuts. The Rockefeller Center is 
not moving, it is as still as anything can be, 
can’t you see it? Yet, once the notion of rela-
tive velocity is accepted, there is no contra-
diction in claiming that the complex is both 
safely motionless in the center of Manhattan 
and insanely hurtling around the sun.  
Likewise, at first, one might be bemused 
by the notion that one’s experience is outside 
one’s body. Yet, the point is not the extent to 
which a hypothesis matches our familiar 
prejudices about the world, but whether such 
a hypothesis is compatible with existing em-
pirical evidence. Does the hypothesis not 
contradict any evidence? In addition, does it 
provide a more parsimonious explanation of 
facts? If these two conditions are met, I be-
lieve any hypothesis – no matter how much 
bizarre it might appear at first – deserves to 
be taken seriously into consideration. 
The existence of apparently contradictory 
facts – such as the fact the earth is both hurt-
ling and still – requires a conceptual revision 
of the notion of velocity, from absolute to rel-
ative. Once revised, the notion of relative ve-
locity does not contradict any empirical evi-
dence and it is more parsimonious than other 
– more commonsensical-conceptual alterna-
tives. Likewise, OBJECTBOUND might be as 
much decisive. 
As a matter of fact, there are no a priori 
reason to locate experience inside the body. 
Neither do we have any contradiction with 
empirical evidence if we do so. Experience 
tells us where our body is rather than where 
experience itself is. It tells us where the cen-
ter of our perceptual apparatus is, but it does 
not tell us anything about what and where 
the thing we are is. If experience is real and 
thus physical, the nature of experience will 
tell us something about the nature of the 
physical world. More specifically, our experi-
ence tells us something about what our expe-
rience is and thus, indirectly, about where 
such an experience is.  
Thus, whenever one perceives something, 
say a yellow banana, one’s perception is simp-
ly the yellow banana lying in front of the per-
ceiver. A series of commonsensical counter-
examples arises almost automatically. 
  
 Isn’t the yellow banana there before and 
after one experiences it? 
 Isn’t the yellow banana outside one’s body 
and thus outside one’s mind? 
 Isn’t the yellow banana different from 
one’s experience? 
 Isn’t the yellow banana a physical object 
while one’s experience is a mental thing? 
 
Isn’t the yellow banana there before and af-
ter one experiences it? This answer has two 
replies. On the one hand, even if the yellow 
banana existed before and after the time span 
during which one’s experience occurs, it 
would not be a fatal blow because the yellow 
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banana can belong to the bundle which is 
one’s experience only for a limited portion of 
time. Likewise, the same molecule of H2O 
can be part of my body for a limited amount 
of time. Before and afterwards, the same 
molecule exists. It is not contradictory that 
the same object is part of my body only for a 
limited time span. The same rationale holds 
for one’s experience. If one’s experience is 
made of objects, such objects belong to such 
a bundle only for a limited time span.  
On the other hand, we need to take into 
account the causal nature of objects. Object 
have a causal nature.48 In other words, an ob-
jects exists when what it is made of has the 
right conditions to take place. In the case of 
most of the objects of our lives, such causal 
conditions are realized by our bodies. The 
objects we perceive do not happen to be 
there when our bodies are not around. Many 
objects reveal openly their causal nature – 
e.g., rainbows, locks, and constellations.49  
Other objects depend in less obvious ways 
to their causal conditions, but I argue else-
where that the connection between objects 
and causal relevance is a general principle.  
Isn’t the banana outside my body? Yes, of 
course. So what? But, from the fact that the 
banana is outside my body does not follow 
that the banana is outside my experience. 
Why must our experience be located inside 
our body?  
Phenomenologically, I do not perceive my 
experiences as being inside my body, unless I 
experience something taking place inside my 
body, as a stone in the gall bladder. There are 
no reasons to believe a priori either that I am 
my body or that my experience is my body. I 
know that, whatever I am, I am physical since I 
assume I am real. But I do not know a priori to 
be either my body or a part of it. Thus, I have 
no reason to postulate that I am my body.  
Of course, people can argue that they 
have the feeling of being inside their bodies. 
But such a feeling is completely inconsequen-
tial insofar as they have no feeling as to 
where their experience is, they have feelings 
about where their bodies are, and their bod-
ies are, of course, located where they bodies 
are. Thus, one should not expect to have any 
mismatch between where one feels to be and 
where one’s body is, because one’s feelings 
are not about where one’s experience is, but 
about where one’s body is. This is nothing 
new, Daniel Dennett argued at length about 
the difference between feeling where the 
mind is and feeling where the body is.50  
Of course, if my body – or a part of it – had 
the same properties of my experience, I could 
draw the conclusion that I am my body. This is 
not the case though. Despite the Sysifean ef-
forts of neuroscience, so far neural processes – 
the most promising part of my body – have 
none of the properties of my experience.  
Thus I feel entitled to look elsewhere. I 
look for something physical akin to my expe-
rience of the yellow banana and the yellow ba-
nana lies on the table. Thus, the yellow banana 
is outside my body but, crucially, not outside 
the physical thing which is my experience. 
Isn’t the yellow banana different from one’s 
experience? We are back to Descartes’s square 
one. We have no a priori knowledge or beliefs 
about what one’s experience is. We need to 
find it. Traditionally, philosophers have con-
trasted notions about experience against no-
tions about bananas. Since the notions didn’t 
match, they concluded that experience must 
be different from the banana. Consider a dif-
ferent angle. Rather than contrasting the con-
cept of experience against the concept of ob-
jects, it is more fruitful to contrast experience 
and objects. We do not know a priori whether 
experiences are different from bananas.  
As a matter of fact, they look the same to 
me. They look so much the same to me that 
– I dare to say – I have never experienced a 
yellow banana without, unsurprisingly, an 
experience of a yellow banana. Thus, why 
should they be different?  
Only because philosophers amused them-
selves attributing aboutness, subjectivity, pri-
vateness, first-person perspective to the for-
mer and quantity, matter, causal powers to the 
latter? Such metaphysical apartheid was a by-
product of a wrong assumption rather than an 
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empirical fact. In my life, there has always 
been only one banana, which was both my ex-
perience and the banana I could grab and eat. 
Isn’t the yellow banana a physical object 
while one’s experience is a mental thing?  
Once again. Such a gap is not something 
we know a priori. The Galilean divide (aka 
the Hard Problem) has been introduced to 
justify our prejudices about bananas and our 
experience. Once such prejudices are set 
aside, the whole distinction between physical 
objects and mental entities collapses. There 
are just objects. Some of such objects are part 
of what we are. When an object is part of 
one’s experience, is not different from the ob-
ject it was before. It exists, if it does, without 
being part of anyone’s experience. There are 
no objects and experiences. There are only 
objects. Sometimes, an object is part of a 
bundle and that bundle is the thing that is 
someone’s experience. Sometimes, it is not. 
 
█  Conclusion 
 
The mismatch is not between experience 
and reality, the mismatch is between what we 
believe experience and reality are. Or, to put 
it differently, between our alleged knowledge 
of what experience is and our alleged 
knowledge of what reality is. The mismatch, 
in short, is not between experience and reali-
ty, but between beliefs about them.  
If you are a physicalist of any stripe, you 
ought to assume that whenever you have an 
experience E, a physical phenomenon X 
should exist such that E is X. Of course, we 
do not know a priori what X is. Neuroscien-
tists have based their work on the assump-
tion that, whatever X was, X must be inside 
the brain. In contrast, here, the hypothesis is 
that X is O, rather than B as it has often been 
assumed. A radically different yet physicalist 
hypothesis is thus put forward: OBJECT-
BOUND. I suggest that one’s experience is 
identical with an object outside the body. 
If the hypothesis that one’s experience of 
a yellow banana is the neural activity inside 
the cortex, why should we resist to the hy-
pothesis that one’s experience of the yellow 
banana is the banana itself? Why neural pro-
cesses are taken to be a more respectable 
choice than external objects? The banana has 
a long list of advantages. It is yellow, elongat-
ed, and bananish. Neural processes have 
none of such properties. The banana has. 
In this paper, I outlined a mind-object 
identity theory. Scientists have devoted hu-
mongous resources and time to look for the 
right process inside the body with no satis-
factory result. I believe it is just fair we spend 
some time to check the object side of the 
equation. There is no metaphysical reason to 
prefer the physical phenomena on the inner 
side of the skin rather than the physical phe-
nomena on the outer side. As David Arm-
strong once wrote, «man is nothing but a 
material object having none but physical 
properties».51 I couldn’t agree more. Yet, I 
take into consideration the external object 
rather than the brain or the body. 
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